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Abstract
This paper deals with the existence of marginal pricing equilibria or equilibria with
general pricing rules in an economy with increasing returns to scale or more gen-
eral types of non convexities in production. Its main contribution is to posit the
bounded loss and survival assumptions on a bounded subset of production alloca-
tions. Furthermore, the free-disposal assumption is weaken, which allows to consider
non positive prices. Finally, we also provide an existence result for a quasi-equilibria,
when the survival assumption is weaken on the attainable allocations.
Keywords General economic equilibrium , increasing returns, general pricing rules,
bounded losses, marginal pricing rule, free disposal.
1 Introduction
Since Guesnerie (1975), many research works have addressed the existence
problem of equilibria in economies with increasing returns or exhibiting more
general types of non-convexities in the production sector. The failure of the
competitive mechanism in this situation has led to reconsider the firms be-
haviour. Various alternatives were proposed in former economic literature,
that have been formalized in the general equilibrium theory framework.
Email addresses: Jean-Marc.Bonnisseau@univ-paris1.fr (J.-M. Bonnisseau),
Alexandrine.Jamin@univ-paris1.fr (A. Jamin).
One of the most important is the marginal cost theory. Following Hotelling
(1938), economic efficiency could be achieved only if every commodity is sold
at marginal cost. Formally, firms are supposed to minimize their costs and
set their selling prices equal to marginal cost. This implicitly supposes that
there is a cost function associated with every available technology, and that
it is differentiable. To allow for non smooth production sets, this rule was
generalized and called the marginal pricing rule: firms follow the marginal
pricing rule if they fulfill the first order necessary condition for their profit
maximization, in the precise mathematical sense formalized by Clarke’s normal
cone [see Cornet (1989)].
Another theory then followed from the will to unify the existing results and to
allow for a larger diversity for firms behaviours in an economy. In this theory,
firms are supposed to follow a general pricing rule, which can be the average
pricing rule, the voluntary pricing rule, a Ramsey-Boiteux like pricing rule
or many others [see Dierker et al. (1985), Dehez and Dre`ze (1988a, 1988b),
Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988)].
There is an important gap between these two theories. Indeed, while more
assumptions are required in existence results for general pricing rules (the
bounded loss assumption, for instance), the existence proofs for marginal
pricing equilibria involve more sophisticated mathematical techniques from
differential topology. However, this gap is bridged by Bonnisseau (1992) who
proves that, under several standard assumptions, a general pricing rule with
bounded losses can be found, that coincides with the marginal pricing rule on
the attainable set. This allows us to derive the existence of a marginal pricing
equilibrium from the existence of an equilibrium for general pricing rules with
bounded losses.
The purpose of this paper is to weaken three crucial assumptions on production
allocations, namely the boundedness, the survival and the bounded losses
assumptions. To present these assumptions, we first define the t-attainable
production allocations for a real number t ≥ 0, which are the production
allocations that become attainable when t units of a reference commodity
bundle (which can be seen as a specie) are injected in the economy.
The boundedness assumption ensures that, for every t ≥ 0, the set of the t-
attainable production allocations is bounded. The bounded losses assumption
states that the losses of the firms are bounded below when they follow their
pricing rules. Finally, the survival assumption states that, for every t ≥ 0, and
every t-attainable production allocation, if all the firms set the same price
according to the pricing rule, then the global profit (or loss) plus the value
of the t units of the reference commodity bundle is strictly greater than the
consumer’s subsistence level.
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A major weakness of these assumptions leads in the fact that they involve
very large production whereas the equilibrium allocation always lies in the set
of attainable allocations. So, we need asymptotic properties of the production
sets although the interesting part is bounded. Note that the usual convexity
assumption shares the same weakness.
In order to remain as close as possible to the attainable allocations, which
are the relevant ones from an economic point of view, we propose here to
limit the boundedness, the bounded losses and the survival assumptions to a
bounded subset of production allocations. More precisely, we assume that the
set of t0-attainable allocations is bounded for some nonnegative real number
t0. Then, we assume that the survival assumption holds true on the set of
strictly t0-attainable allocations, that is the set of allocations t-attainable for
some t < t0. Finally, we state a bounded losses-like assumption on the set of
production allocations, which are t1-attainable but not strictly t0-attainable.
The difference between t1 and t0 is a measure of the nonconvexity of the
production sets. If the set of t0-attainable allocation is convex, then t1 = t0.
In the particular case of the loss-free pricing rule, we only need to assume
that the set of attainable production allocations is bounded. So, we recover a
result of Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988) within a general framework whereas
a particular argument was needed before.
The main interest of this result comes from the fact that it can be used to
study perturbed economy, when this perturbation affects the pricing rules.
Thus, if an economy satisfies the necessary conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium, every close enough economy satisfies them also. Indeed, since we
only need to checks some inequalities on compact sets, we can expect that the
inequalities remain true even for sufficiently small perturbations.
Another interest comes from the applications to the economies with infinitely
many commodities. Indeed, since we cannot expect to get a Pareto optimal
equilibrium allocation, the only way to prove the existence of an equilibrium is
to consider a finite dimensional approximation of the commodity space, and,
then to do a limit argument. But, it remains to prove that an equilibrium
exists in the finite dimensional auxiliary economies. For this, starting from
assumptions on the infinite dimensional original economy, we can again ex-
pect that the approximate economy satisfy the necessary conditions for the
existence of an equilibrium if the commodity space is large enough.
Another contribution of this paper is a weakening of the free-disposal as-
sumption. Instead of considering the standard positive orthantt, we suppose
the existence of a free-disposal cone, which is a pointed closed cone with a
nonempty interior. An interesting consequence is that we allow the firms to
set negative prices for some commodities at some production. This feature may
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be useful in approximating infinite dimensional economies or when we want to
incorporate some strategic aspect in the behavior of the firms by considering
imperfect competition a` la Negishi [see Dehez et al. (2003)].
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model
and posit the standard assumptions that describe the general framework. In
section 3 we state our main existence result (Theorem 1), which proof rests
on a generalization of the fundamental result of Debreu (1956), Gale (1955)
and Nikaidoˆ (1956) (Theorem 2). In section 4, thanks to the unifying result
in Bonnisseau (1992), we deduce from Theorem 1 the existence of marginal
pricing equilibria (Theorem 3). Finally, we give in section 5 an existence result
for quasi-equilibria (Theorem 4) when the survival assumption is no longer
supposed satisfied on the set of the attainable production allocations. The
Appendix gathers the proofs of all the lemmata stated along the paper.
2 The model and the assumptions
The commodity space is a `-dimensional Euclidean space L. We denote by
ω ∈ L the vector of total initial endowments of the economy.
We consider a finite number n of firms (indexed by j = 1, . . . , n). The tech-
nological possibilities of firms j are represented by its production set Yj ⊂ L.
Assumption (P)
For every j, Yj is a nonempty, closed subset of L, different from L. There exists
a closed, convex, pointed cone D of vertex 0 in L with a nonempty interior
such that, for every j, Yj satisfies the free-diposal property Yj −D = Yj.
In this model the production sets do not need to be convex. Without convexity,
the analysis strongly rests on a free-disposal assumption: we suppose that there
exists a free-disposal coneD common to all the firms. Actually, if the firms have
different free-disposal cones Dj, we can consider a common cone D = ∩nj=1Dj.
We only need to assume that the interior of the cone D is nonempty if each
cone Dj satisfy the condition in Assumption (P).
The properties of D implies that there exists e ∈ intD such that D ⊂ e+ =
{0} ∪ {x ∈ L | x · e > 0}. This reference commodity bundle e, which can be
seen as a specie, will be assigned an important role throughout this paper.
The usual setting is L = R`, D = R`+ and e = (1, . . . , 1).
Remark 1 : Under Assumption (P), for every j, the boundary ∂Yj of the
production set Yj is exactly the set of weakly efficient productions, that is
∂Yj = {yj ∈ Yj | [{yj} + intD] ∩ Yj = ∅}. As it is well known, equilibria of
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an economy in which the production sets are not supposed convex may not
be aggregate productive efficient [see the example in Beato and Mas-Colell
(1985)]. However, in order to get equilibria individually weakly productive
efficient, we shall consider productions in the boundaries ∂Yj of the production
sets.
Note that if, for the price vector p ∈ L, p · e ≤ 0, then the firms could prefer,
in terms of profits, a non efficient production y˜j = yj − te, with t > 0, to
the efficient production yj ∈ ∂Yj. In this case, there is actually no incentive
for the firms to be efficient in their production choice. To be consistent with
our efficiency requirement, we shall consider price vectors in the price set
P = (−D◦) \ {0} ⊂ e+, where D◦ denotes the negative polar cone of D.
This condition is clearly satisfied in the classical framework with non negative
prices when L = R`, D = R`+ and e = (1, . . . , 1).
Let us finally point out that our setting makes room for negative prices. Indeed,
if the commodity space is endowed with an order structure such that the
positive cone L+ is a closed, convex, pointed cone of vertex 0 with a nonempty
interior, and if the free-disposal assumption is satisfied with L+, then it is
satisfied for any closed, convex pointed cone D of vertex 0 contained in L+,
and we then have L+ ⊂ −D◦. This means that the price set is larger than the
set of non negative prices. The smaller is the free disposal cone D, the larger
is the price set P .
We consider a finite number m of consumers (indexed by i = 1, . . . ,m). The
consumption set Xi ⊂ L is the subset of all possible consumptions for con-
sumer i, given her physical constraints. The tastes of this consumer are de-
scribed by a binary preference relation 1 ¹i on Xi, and her wealth is given
by a function ri : P × ∏nj=1 ∂Yj → R, i.e., given the price vector p ∈ P and
the weakly efficient productions (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 ∂Yj, the wealth of consumer i is
ri(p, (yj)). This abstract wealth structure clearly encompasses the case of a
private ownership economy, in which ri(p, (yj)) =
∑n
j=1 θijp · yj + p · ωi, where
the θij denote the consumers’ shares in the production processes and satisfy
θij ≥ 0 for all i, j and ∑mi=1 θij = 1 for all j, and where the ωi denote the
consumers’ initial individual endowments and satisfy
∑m
i=1 ωi = ω.
Assumption (C)
For every i, Xi is a non-empty, closed, convex subset of L such that AXi ⊂ e+,
¹i is a continuous, convex and non-satiated complete preorder 2 on Xi, and ri
1 We define x ≺i x′ by [x ¹i x′ and not x′ ¹i x].
2 AXi is the asymptotic cone to Xi, that is AXi = ∩k≥0Γk, where Γk denotes the
smallest closed, convex cone with vertex 0 containing the set {xi ∈ Xi | ‖xi‖ ≥ k};
for every xi ∈ Xi, the subsets {x ∈ Xi | x ¹i xi} and {x ∈ Xi | xi ¹i x} are closed,
the subset {x ∈ Xi | xi ¹i x} is convex, and, there exists x ∈ Xi such that xi ≺i x;
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is a continuous function on P ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj, satisfying ri(λp, (yj)) = λri(p, (yj))
for every λ > 0 and every (p, (yj)) ∈ P ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj.
This assumption is classical, apart from the condition that AXi ⊂ e+ for every
i. It is satisfied in the particular case where L = R`, e = (1, . . . , 1) and all the
consumption set Xi are bounded below. Nevertheless, our assumption allows
us to consider consumption sets which are not bounded from below, like the
following one in R2:{
(x1, x2) ∈ R2 x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ − ln(x1 + 1)
}
.
This assumption is sufficient to guarantee the boundedness of the consumption
allocations for given productions.
We letX =
∑m
i=1Xi+D−ω. In the following lemma, we gather some properties
of X which are direct consequences of Assumption (C). The proof is given in
Appendix.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption (C), X is a nonempty, closed, convex subset of
L, different from L and satisfying X +D = X. Furthermore, for all compact
subset K of X, the following set is compact:{
((xi), d) ∈ ∏mi=1Xi ×D ∑mi=1 xi + d− ω ∈ K
}
.
For every real number t ≥ 0, we call t-attainable production allocation any
element in:
At =
{
(yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 ∂Yj ∑nj=1 yj + t e ∈ X
}
.
At is the set of all productions which become attainable when t units of the
reference commodity bundle e are added to the total initial endowments ω. At
is closed under the Assumptions (P) and (C) since X is closed and the pro-
duction sets are closed. A0 clearly denotes the set of all attainable production
allocations.
Remark 2 : Note that, from Lemma 1, if we let Y0 = −X, then under As-
sumptions (P) and (C), for every j = 0, 1, . . . , n, the set Yj is a nonempty,
closed subset of L, different from L and satisfying the free-disposal property
Yj−D = Yj . We can therefore apply the following lemma [see the proof in Ap-
pendix] which generalizes Lemma 5.1 in Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988) to our
setting. We denoteby proje⊥ the orthogonal projection on e
⊥, the orthogonal
space 3 to e ∈ intD.
¹i is a complete, reflexive, transitive binary relation.
3 That is, e⊥ = {s ∈ L | s · e = 0}.
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Lemma 2 Let Yj be a non-empty, closed subset of L, different from L and
satisfying Yj −D = Yj. Then, for every s ∈ e⊥, there is a unique real number,
denoted by λj(s), such that s − λj(s)e ∈ ∂Yj. The function λj : e⊥ → R
is Lipschitz continuous, and the mapping Λj : s ∈ e⊥ 7→ s − λj(s)e ∈ ∂Yj
is an homeomorphism. The inverse of Λj is the restriction of the orthogonal
projection on e⊥ to ∂Yj. Finally, we have:
Yj =
{
yj ∈ L λj(proje⊥(yj)) + yj ·e‖e‖2 ≤ 0
}
.
Consequently, under Assumptions (P) and (C), ∂Yj is homeomorphic to the
Euclidean space e⊥ for every j = 0, 1, . . . , n. We define the mapping Λ :
(e⊥)n → ∏nj=1 ∂Yj by Λ(s) = (Λj(sj)) for s = (sj) and we remark that it is
an homeomorphism. Finally, Yj is described by the transformation function
gj(yj) = λj(proje⊥(yj)) +
yj ·e
‖e‖2 .
For every real number t ≥ 0, let Mt be the inverse image under Λ of At:
Mt : = Λ
−1(At) =
{
s = (sj) ∈
(
e⊥
)n ∑n
j=1 Λj(sj) + te ∈ X
}
.
Let θ be the function defined on (e⊥)n by:
θ(s) =
∑n
j=1 λj(sj) + λ0(−
∑n
j=1 sj) .
Then θ is Lipschitz continuous under the Assumptions (P) and (C) and, for
every real number t ≥ 0, we have:
Mt =
{
s ∈
(
e⊥
)n
θ(s) ≤ t
}
,
and
At =
{
(yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 ∂Yj θ[(proje⊥(yj))] ≤ t
}
.
The function θ measures the distance of the global production
∑n
j=1 yj to the
global consumption set X. More precisely, if
∑n
j=1 yj /∈ X, then
∑n
j=1 yj +
θ((proje⊥(yj)))e ∈ ∂X.
Under Assumptions (P) and (C), if the set At is compact, then the continuity
of the mapping Λ−1 implies that the set Mt is compact. Hence, the convex
hull coMt of the set Mt is compact. When At is nonempty and compact, we
let Θ(t) = max{θ(s) | s ∈ coMt}.
We suppose that the firms in the economy follow a general pricing rule ϕ, which
is a correspondence from P ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj into (e+)n. This means that, given the
price vector p ∈ P and the weakly efficient productions (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 ∂Yj, each
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firm j chooses a price vector qj ∈ e+ so that (qj) ∈ ϕ(p, (yj)). Note that, in the
classical framework, D = R`+, P = R`+ \ {0} and ϕ(p, (yj)) ⊂ (R`+)n for every
(p, (yj)) ∈ R`+ \ {0}×
∏n
j=1 ∂Yj. The possibility of prices qj in e
+, i.e., of price
vectors not necessarily belonging to the price space P , is purely a technical
requirement. We shall use it in Section 4 to deduce the existence of a marginal
pricing equilibrium from the existence of an equilibrium for general pricing
rules with bounded losses.
In the following, we will consider without any loss of generality normalized
price vector. Indeed, the wealth functions ri are supposed to be homogeneous
with respect to the price vector and we will assume the same property for the
pricing rule. Let H = {p ∈ L | p · e = 1} ⊂ e+ and S = P ∩ H. The choice of
e implies that S is compact. The normalized general pricing rule, denoted by
ϕ, is defined for every (p, (yj)) ∈ S ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj by:
ϕ(p, (yj)) = ϕ(p, (yj)) ∩Hn.
Assumption (PR)
For every (p, (yj)) ∈ P × ∏nj=1 ∂Yj, ϕ(p, (yj)) is a nonempty, closed, convex
cone of vertex 0, different from {0}, included in (e+)n, and ϕ(λp, (yj)) =
ϕ(p, (yj)) for every λ > 0. ϕ(p, (yj)) ⊂ Sn for every (p, (yj)) ∈ S ×A0, and ϕ
is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence on S ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj with nonempty,
convex, compact values in Hn.
The production sector is said to be at equilibrium for the price vector p and
the production allocation (yj) if each firm can actually choose the price vector
p, that is if (p, . . . , p) ∈ ϕ(p, (yj)). We denote by PE the set of normalized
production equilibria, that is:
PE =
{
(p, (yj)) ∈ S ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj (p, . . . , p) ∈ ϕ(p, (yj))
}
.
The set of the normalized attainable production equilibria is then:
APE =
{
(p, (yj)) ∈ PE (yj) ∈ A0
}
.
Note that, under Assumptions (P), (C) and (PR), APE is closed since the
normalized pricing rule ϕ is upper hemi-continuous and the set A0 is closed.
3 Existence of equilibria for general pricing rules
Let us first present the notion of equilibrium in an economy with a general
pricing rule.
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Definition 1 An element ((x∗i ), (y
∗
j ), p
∗) in Lm×Ln×P is an equilibrium of
the economy E = (L, (Xi,¹i, ri), (Yj), ϕ, ω) if:
(a) for every i, x∗i is a greater element for ¹i in Bi(p∗, (y∗j )) = {xi ∈ Xi |
p∗ · xi ≤ ri(p∗, (y∗j ))};
(b) for every j, y∗j ∈ ∂Yj and (p∗, . . . , p∗) ∈ ϕ(p∗, (y∗j ));
(c)
∑m
i=1 x
∗
i =
∑n
j=1 y
∗
j + ω.
This definition is a generalization of the notion of a Walras equilibrium to our
setting. The firms’ profit maximization condition is replaced by the condition
that they follow the general pricing rule ϕ.
To establish the existence of equilibria in the economy E , two further assump-
tions on the wealth’s distribution are needed. The first one is a condition on
the consumers’ individual wealth:
Assumption (R)
For every i and every (p, (yj)) ∈ APE, ri(p, (yj)) > inf p · Xi. Furthermore,∑m
i=1 ri(p, (yj)) = p · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω) for every (p, (yj)) ∈ PE.
The second condition gathers three independent assumptions made in pre-
vious works, namely, the boundedness, the survival and the bounded losses
assumptions. To limit these assumptions to a bounded subset of production
allocations, we shall posit the following. Actually, this constitutes the major
improvement with respect to the previous existence results. First, we only
need to have a bounded attainable allocation set only with a limited increase
of the initial endowments whereas it is usually assumed that the attainable
allocations are bounded for all greater initial endowments. We also posit the
survival assumption only on a bounded neighborhood of the attainable al-
locations and not for all production equilibria. Finally, the bounded losses
assumption is also restricted to productions which are at a finite distance of
the attainable productions, in the sense that they becomes attainable with a
bounded increase of the initial endowments.
Assumption (BLS)
There exists a real number t0 ≥ 0 such that At0 is nonempty and bounded,
and:
(BS) for every t ∈ [0, t0[ and every (p, (yj)) ∈ PE, if ∑nj=1 yj + te ∈ X, then
p · (∑nj=1 yj + te) > inf p ·X;
(BL) for every t ∈ [t0,Θ(t0)], every (p, (yj)) ∈ S × At and every (qj) ∈
ϕ(p, (yj)), if p ∈ −NX(∑nj=1 yj + te), then there exists (yˆj) ∈ At0 such that∑n
j=1(qj − p) · (yj − yˆj) > 0.
Remark 3 : Remark that Assumption (BLS) implies that:
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For every t ∈ [0,Θ(t0)] and every (p, (yj)) ∈ PE, if ∑nj=1 yj + te ∈ X, then
p · (∑nj=1 yj + te) > inf p ·X.
Indeed, it is clear for every t ∈ [0, t0[ part (BS) of Assumption (BLS). For
every t ∈ [t0,Θ(t0)], if (p, (yj)) ∈ PE and ∑nj=1 yj+ te ∈ ∂X, then (p, . . . , p) ∈
ϕ(p, (yj)) and
∑n
j=1(p − p) · (yj − yˆj) = 0 for any (yˆj) ∈
∏n
j=1 ∂Yj. Conse-
quently, the contraposition of Part (BL) of Assumption (BLS) implies that
p 6∈ −NX(∑nj=1 yj + te).
This means that, at production equilibria, if t units of the reference commodity
bundle e are added to the total initial endowments ω in such a way that
the production allocation becomes attainable, then the total wealth of the
economy is above the consumers’ subsistence level.
Remark 4 : Part (BL) of Assumption (BLS) is a weakening of the following
bounded losses assumption, made in Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988), where
the pricing rule is supposed to take its values in P n. It means that the nor-
malized general pricing rule ϕ cannot generate losses lower than α. Note that
the existence theorem in Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988) requires a stronger
boundedness assumption, which is, with our notations, At is bounded for ev-
ery t ≥ 0.
Assumption (BL) There exists a real number α such that, for every (p, (yj)) ∈
S ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj and every (qj) ∈ ϕ(p, (yj)), ∑nj=1 qj · yj ≥ α.
Indeed, let (yˆj) ∈ ∏nj=1 ∂Yj and τ = θ(sˆ), where sˆ = (proje⊥(yˆj)). Let t0 ≥ τ
and t0 >
∑n
j=1 sup{σ · yˆj | σ ∈ S − S} + sup{q · x | q ∈ S} − α, where x
is any fixed element in X. For every t ≥ t0, every (p, (yj)) ∈ S × At and
every (qj) ∈ ϕ(p, (yj)), if p ∈ −NX(∑nj=1 yj + te), then p · (∑nj=1 yj + te) =
p ·∑nj=1 yj + t = inf p ·X. If ϕ satisfies Assumption (BL), then ∑nj=1 qj · yj ≥ α
and:
∑n
j=1 qj · yj >
∑n
j=1 sup{σ · yˆj | σ ∈ S − S}+ sup{q · x | q ∈ S} − t0
≥ ∑nj=1(qj − p) · yˆj + inf p ·X − t
≥ ∑nj=1(qj − p) · yˆj + p ·∑nj=1 yj,
hence ϕ satisfies Part (BL) of Assumption (BLS).
Remark 5 : An interesting feature of Assumption (BLS) is that it allows to
get an unified proof for loss free and bounded losses pricing rules. Indeed, in
Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988), the proofs are different essentially because, in
the case of loss free pricing rules, the boundedness assumption is only A0 is
bounded. Actually, under this condition, Assumption (BLS) (with t0 = 0) is
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satisfied for loss free pricing rule, that is when α = 0 in Assumption (BL),
under a strong survival assumption like ω ∈ int(∑mi=1Xi + D). Indeed, let
yˆj = 0 − λj(0)e for every j, and (qj) ∈ ϕ(p, (yˆj)) for any p ∈ S. One has∑n
j=1 qj · yˆj = −(
∑n
j=1 λj(0)) ≥ 0, hence
∑n
j=1 yˆj ∈ D. From ω ∈ int(
∑n
j=1Xi+
D) we get 0 ∈ intX. Since X + D = X, ∑nj=1 yˆj ∈ D ⊂ X, i.e., (yˆj) ∈ A0.
Note also that inf p · X < 0 for all p ∈ S since 0 ∈ intX. Now, let t ≥ 0,
(p, (yj)) ∈ S ×At and (qj) ∈ ϕ(p, (yj)). If p ∈ −NX(∑nj=1 yj + te), then, since
ϕ is a loss-free pricing rule,
∑n
j=1(qj − p) · (yj − yˆj) =
∑n
j=1(qj − p) · yj ≥ 0− inf p ·X + t > 0.
Consequently, Assumption (BLS) is satisfied since, when t0 = 0, part (BS) is
obviously satisfied.
The classical competitive framework a` la Arrow-Debreu, where the production
sets are convex and the firms are supposed to maximize their profits, corres-
ponds to the pricing rule given by ϕ(p, (yj)) =
∏n
j=1NYj(yj), where NYj(yj)
denotes the normal cone to the closed, convex set Yj at yj ∈ Yj. In this
setting, if A0 is supposed compact, then Assumption (BLS) (with t0 = 0) is a
consequence of the aggregate survival assumption ω ∈ int(∑mi=1Xi +D) and
the possibility of inaction, that is 0 ∈ Yj for all j. Indeed, this is a consequence
of the previous argument. The pricing rule is loss free since, for every j, every
yj ∈ ∂Yj and every qj ∈ NYj(yj), qj · yj ≥ qj · 0 = 0.
When the production sets are convex, if A0 is nonempty and bounded, then
At is also nonempty and bounded for all t ≥ 0. This is no more true in the
non-convex case.
We shall in this section establish the following existence result.
Theorem 1 The economy E = (L, (Xi,¹i, ri), (Yj), ϕ, ω) has an equilibrium
under Assumptions (P), (C), (PR), (R) and (BLS).
3.1 The preliminary result
In order to prove the existence of equilibria in the economy E , we shall follow
Debreu, Gale and Nikaido’s approach. We first give a result on an arbitrary ex-
cess demand correspondence, from which we deduce the existence of equilibria
for general pricing rules in an economy under increasing returns.
Let thus z be an arbitrary excess demand correspondence. As in Bonnisseau
and Cornet (1991), we posit the following assumption:
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Assumption (ED)
z is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence on S × ∏nj=1 ∂Yj with non-
empty, convex, compact values in L. Furthermore, for every (p, (yj)) ∈ APE,
z(p, (yj)) ∈ TX(∑nj=1 yj) and sup p · z(p, (yj)) ≤ 0.
Remark 6 : The condition that sup p · z(p, (yj)) ≤ 0 for every (p, (yj)) ∈
APE is the translation of the Walras law in our model, as a consequence of
the fact that the total wealth of the economy is shared among the consumer
[Assumption (R)].
We can now establish our preliminary result on the excess demand correspon-
dence z.
Theorem 2 Under Assumptions (P), (C), (PR), (BLS) and (ED), there is
an element (p∗, (y∗j )) in S ×
∏n
j=1 ∂Yj satisfying:
(a)
∑n
j=1 y
∗
j ∈ X;
(b) (p∗, . . . , p∗) ∈ ϕ(p∗, (y∗j ));
(c) z(p∗, (y∗j )) ∩ −R+e 6= ∅.
The proof of Theorem 1 is divided into 3 steps.
3.1.1 Step 1
In the first step, we construct auxiliary excess demand correspondences. Let
α > 0 be a real number, and let Sα = S+αBe⊥(0, 1), where Be⊥(0, 1) denotes
the closed unit ball in e⊥. In the following, we denote by proje⊥ the orthogonal
projection onto e⊥, by pi the projection mapping from L to S, and we define
the mapping projX , from L to X, by:
projX(y) = proje⊥(y) + max
{
λ0 (−proje⊥(y)) ,
y · e
‖e‖2
}
e.
Recall that, under Assumptions (P) and (C), the set At0 is closed. Moreover,
from Assumption (BLS), At0 is nonempty and bounded. Therefore, At0 and
Mt0 are nonempty and compact. In this step, we shall work in the nonempty,
convex, compact set Bγ = coMt0 + γB(e⊥)n(0, 1). Since Bγ is not necessarily
included inMΘ(t0), there may be elements (yj) ∈ Λ(Bγ) such that
∑n
j=1 yj+te ∈
∂X with t > Θ(t0). The following lemma, proved in the Appendix, establish
that if Assumption (BLS) is satisfied, then there exists γ > 0 small enough
such that the elements (yj) ∈ Bγ also satisfy the conclusions of Part (BL) of
Assumption (BLS) for t > Θ(t0).
Lemma 3 Under Assumption (BLS), there exists γ > 0 such that:
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(BS) for every (p, (yj)) ∈ S × Λ(Bγ), if (p, (yj)) ∈ PE and ∑nj=1 yj + te ∈ X
with t ≥ 0, then p · (∑nj=1 yj + te) > inf p ·X;
(BL) for every (p, (yj)) ∈ S × Λ(Bγ) and every (qj) ∈ ϕ(p, (yj)), if p ∈
−NX(∑nj=1 yj + te) with t ≥ t0, then there exists (yˆj) ∈ At0 such that∑n
j=1(qj − p) · (yj − yˆj) > 0.
Let now U be the set defined as follows:
U =
{
(p, (yj)) ∈ Sα × Λ(Bγ) p /∈ −NX(projX(
∑n
j=1 yj))
}
.
From the properties of the normal cone and the continuity of the mapping
projX , U is an open subset of Sα × Λ(Bγ) (for its relative topology) which
contains APE from Lemma 3. Moreover, from Assumption (BLS), there exists
t0 ≥ 0 such that At0 is bounded, hence A0 is bounded and APE is compact
from Assumptions (P), (C) and (PR). Consequently, there is a real number
ε0 > 0 such that, for every ε ∈ ]0, ε0[, the closed ball B(APE, ε) in Sα×Λ(Bγ)
is a subset of U , and, for every (p, (yj)) ∈ B(APE, ε), p belongs to the relative
interior of Sα. Hence, for every ε ∈ ]0, ε0[, there is a continuous function
τ ε : Sα × Λ(Bt0)→ [0, 1] satisfying:
τ ε(p, (yj)) = 1 if (p, (yj)) ∈ APE,
τ ε(p, (yj)) = 0 if (p, (yj)) /∈ B(APE, ε).
We now define the correspondence Ψ, from Sα × Λ(Bγ) into L, as follows:
Ψ(p, (yj)) = intTX(projX(
∑n
j=1 yj)) ∩ {u ∈ L | p · u < 0} ∩BL(0, 1) ,
where BL(0, 1) denotes the open unit ball in L. Ψ has an open graph and
convex values, and Ψ(p, (yj)) 6= ∅ for every (p, (yj)) ∈ U . Let thus ψ : U → L
be a continuous selection 4 of Ψ, and ζ be the correspondence from Sα×Λ(Bγ)
into L defined by:
ζ(p, (yj)) =
 {ψ(p, (yj))} if (p, (yj)) ∈ U,BL(0, 1) otherwise.
ζ is clearly an upper hemi-continuous correspondence with nonempty, convex,
compact values.
4 For every (p, (yj)) ∈ U , ψ(p, (yj)) ∈ Ψ(p, (yj)). The existence of a selection is a
consequence of a weak version of Michael’s Theorem since Ψ has an open graph.
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We finally define the auxiliary excess demand correspondence zε, for every
ε ∈]0, ε0[, as follows:
zε(p, (yj)) = τ
ε(p, (yj))z(pi(p), (yj)) + (1− τ ε(p, (yj)))ζ(p, (yj)).
For every ε ∈]0, ε0[, zε is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence with
nonempty, convex, compact values satisfying the following properties:
zε(p, (yj)) = z(p, (yj)) if (p, (yj)) ∈ APE,
zε(p, (yj)) = {ψ(p, (yj))} if (p, (yj)) ∈ U \B(APE, ε).
3.1.2 Step 2
We claim that, for every ε ∈]0, ε0[, there exists (pε, (yεj )) ∈ B(APE, ε) and xε ∈
zε(pε, (yεj )) such that x
ε ∈ Re. Furthermore, if ∑nj=1 yεj ∈ X, then (pε, (yεj )) ∈
APE.
First of all, let us point out that, for every ε ∈]0, ε0[, the properties of zε
imply that there exists a nonempty, convex, compact subset Kε ⊂ L such
that zε(p,Λ(s)) ⊂ Kε for every (p, s) ∈ Sα × Bγ. Moreover, from the upper
hemi-continuity of the normalized pricing rule ϕ and the continuity of the
projection mapping pi, there exists a compact subset S in H, containing S,
such that ϕ(pi(p),Λ(s)) ⊂ Sn for every (p, s) ∈ Sα × Bγ.
We now let F ε be the correspondence from Kε × Bγ × Sα × Sn into itself
defined by:
F ε(x, s, p, (pj)) =
4∏
ν=1
F εν (x, s, p, (pj)),
where:
F ε1 (x, s, p, (pj)) = z
ε(p,Λ(s)),
F ε2 (x, s, p, (pj)) =
{
(σj) ∈ Bγ ∀(σ′j) ∈ Bγ :
∑n
j=1(p− pj) · (σj − σ′j) ≥ 0
}
,
F ε3 (x, s, p, (pj)) =
{
q ∈ Sα ∀q′ ∈ Sα : (q − q′) · x ≥ 0
}
,
F ε4 (x, s, p, (pj)) = ϕ
(
pi(p),Λ(s)
)
.
From Assumption (PR), from the properties of zε and from the maximum
Theorem in Berge (1959), F ε is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence with
non-empty, convex, compact values. Consequently, from Kakutani’s theorem,
for every ε ∈]0, ε0[, there exists a fixed point (xε, sε, pε, (pεj)) of F ε satisfying
xε ∈ zε(p,Λ(sε)) and:
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∑n
j=1(p
ε − pεj) · sεj ≥
∑n
j=1(p
ε − pεj) · sj for every (sj) ∈ Bγ (1)
pε · xε ≥ p · xε for every p ∈ Sα (2)
(pεj) ∈ ϕ
(
pi(pε),Λ(sε)
)
(3)
We let (yεj ) = Λ(s
ε). The following claims establish that (pε, (yεj )) ∈ B(APE, ε),
xε ∈ zε(pε, (yεj )) ∩ Re, and (pε, (yεj )) ∈ APE if
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j ∈ X.
Claim 1 (pε, (yεj )) ∈ U .
Proof: Suppose, on the contrary, that (pε, (yεj )) /∈ U . Since (pε, (yεj )) ∈ Sα×
Λ(Bγ), we have pε ∈ −NX(projX(
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j )) ⊂ P , hence pε ∈ S. Consequently,
pε 6= 0 and projX(
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j ) ∈ ∂X, hence
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j+te ∈ ∂X with t ≥ 0. We then
deduce from Lemma 3 that (pε, (yεj )) /∈ PE, that is (pε, . . . , pε) /∈ ϕ(pε, (yεj )).
From (3) we get (pε−pε1, . . . , pε−pεn) 6= 0, and (1) then implies that sε ∈ ∂Bγ.
Hence projX(
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j ) =
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j + te with t ≥ t0.
We now remark that, since (yˆj) ∈ At0 , sˆ = (proje⊥(yˆj)) ∈ Mt0 ⊂ intBγ, hence
for ρ > 0 small enough, s = sˆ − ρ(pε1 − pε, . . . , pεn − pε) ∈ Bγ. Consequently,
from (1), we get:
∑n
j=1 p
ε
j · yεj =
∑n
j=1 p
ε · yεj +
∑n
j=1(p
ε
j − pε) · sεj
≤ ∑nj=1 pε · yεj +∑nj=1(pεj − pε) · sˆj − ρ∑nj=1(pεj − pε) · (pεj − pε)
<
∑n
j=1 p
ε · yεj +
∑n
j=1(p
ε
j − pε) · sˆj
<
∑n
j=1 p
ε · yεj +
∑n
j=1(p
ε
j − pε) · yˆj
But, since pε ∈ −NX(projX(
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j )) and (p
ε
j) ∈ ϕ(pε, (yεj )) from (3), this
contradicts Part (BL) of Lemma 3. uunionsq
Claim 2 (pε, (yεj )) ∈ B(APE, ε) and (pε, (yεj )) ∈ APE if
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j ∈ X.
Proof: Suppose first that
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j ∈ X, i.e. that (yεj ) ∈ A0. Then sε ∈
M0 ⊂ intBγ, and (1) implies that pε = pεj for every j, hence pε ∈ S since
ϕ(pi(p), (yεj )) ⊂ Sn from Assumption (PR). From (3) we get (pε, . . . , pε) ∈
ϕ(pε, (yεj )), which means that (p
ε, (yεj )) ∈ PE. Therefore, (pε, (yεj )) ∈ APE.
Suppose now that
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j /∈ X and (pε, (yεj )) /∈ B(APE, ε). Since (pε, (yεj ) ∈ U
from Claim 1, we then have xε ∈ zε(pε, (yεj )) = {ψ(pε, (yεj ))} ⊂ Ψ(pε, (yεj )).
Consequently, xε ∈ TX(projX(
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j )) and p
ε ·xε < 0. From (2), q ·xε < 0 for
every q ∈ Sα, which means that xε belongs to the interior of the negative polar
cone of Sα, included in −intD. But −intD ∩ TX(projX(
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j )) = ∅ since
projX(
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j ) ∈ ∂X and X +D ⊂ X, which leads to a contradiction. uunionsq
Claim 3 xε ∈ zε(pε, (yεj )) ∩ Re.
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Proof: From our choice of ε0 and from Claim 2, p
ε belongs to the relative
interior of Sα. Consequently, (2) implies for x
ε to be in the orthogonal space
to the affine space spanned by Sα, which means that x
ε ∈ Re. Recalling that
xε ∈ F ε1 (xε, sε, pε, (pεj)), we thus have xε ∈ zε(pε, (yεj )) ∩ Re. uunionsq
3.1.3 Step 3
We end the proof of Theorem 2 with a limit argument. We deduce from Step
2 and from the definition of zε in Step 1 that, for every ε ∈ ]0, ε0[, there exists
(pε, (yεj ), x
ε, tε, uε) ∈ Sα ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj × Re× [0, 1]× L satisfying:
(pε, (yεj )) ∈ B(APE, ε),
xε = tεuε + (1− tε)ψ(pε, (yεj )),
tε = τ ε(pε, (yεj )),
uε ∈ z(pi(pε), (yεj )).
Furthermore, if
∑n
j=1 y
ε
j ∈ X, then (pε, (yεj )) ∈ APE and, from the definition
of τ ε, tε = 1 and xε = uε ∈ z(pε, (yεj )).
Recall that, for every ε ∈ ]0, ε0[, B(APE, ε) is in the interior of the compact
set B(APE, ε0). Consequently, there is a sequence (ε
ν) ⊂ ]0, ε0[ converging
to 0 such that the sequence (pε
ν
, (yε
ν
j ), x
εν , tε
ν
, uε
ν
) converges to an element
(p∗, (y∗j ), x
∗, t∗, u∗) in Sα×∏nj=1 ∂Yj×Re×[0, 1]×L. We clearly have (p∗, (y∗j )) ∈
APE, hence (p∗, (y∗j )) satisfies conditions (a) and (b) of Theorem 2.
We now distinguish two cases. Suppose first that
∑n
j=1 y
∗
j ∈ intX. Then, for
ν large enough,
∑n
j=1 y
εν
j ∈ intX, hence (pεν , (yενj )) ∈ APE and tεν = 1.
Consequently, t∗ = 1 and x∗ = u∗ ∈ z(p∗, (y∗j )). We then get p∗ · x∗ ≤ 0 from
Assumption (ED), which implies x∗ ∈ −R+e since x∗ ∈ Re. We finally have
z(p∗, (y∗j )) ∩ −R+e 6= ∅: (p∗, (y∗j )) satisfies condition (c) of Theorem 2.
Suppose now that
∑n
j=1 y
∗
j ∈ ∂X. From Assumption (ED), p∗ · u∗ ≤ 0, and,
from the definition of ψ, p∗ · ψ(p∗, (y∗j )) ≤ 0, so we clearly have p∗ · x∗ ≤ 0.
Consequently, since x∗ ∈ Re and p∗ ∈ S, x∗ ∈ −R+e. We now end the
proof by showing that x∗ = u∗. Indeed, if it is not the case, then, from As-
sumption (ED) and the definition of ψ, x is a convex combination of two
elements in TX(
∑n
j=1 y
∗
j ), one of which belonging to intTX(
∑n
j=1 y
∗
j ). There-
fore, x∗ ∈ intTX(∑nj=1 y∗j ) and x∗ ∈ −R+e, which contradicts the fact that∑n
j=1 y
∗
j ∈ ∂X. Finally, x∗ ∈ z(p∗, (y∗j )) ∩ −R+e: (p∗, (y∗j )) also satisfies condi-
tion (c) of Theorem 2. uunionsq
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3.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Let us first remark that the compacity of the set A0 under Assumptions (P),
(C) and (BLS) implies the compacity of the subset K = {∑nj=1 yj | (yj) ∈ A0}
of X. From Lemma 1, the set {((xi), d) ∈ ∏mi=1Xi×D | ∑mi=1 xi+ d−ω ∈ K}
is compact. Hence, for every i, the projection X̂i of this set on Xi, i.e. the set
of all attainable consumptions for consumer i, is compact in L. Consequently,
from the properties of the preference binary relations ¹i, for every i, there
exists x0i ∈ Xi such that xi ≺i x0i for every xi ∈ X̂i.
For every integer k, we let Kk = {x ∈ L | −k e ≤ x ≤ k e}, and, for every i,
Xki = Xi ∩Kk.
We claim that there exists an integer k0 large enough such that, for every
k ≥ k0 and for every i, x0i ∈ Xki , X̂i ⊂ intKk and
ri(p, (yj)) > inf p ·Xki for every (p, (yj)) ∈ APE. (4)
Indeed, if it is not true, then there exists a sequence (kν , iν , pν , (yνj )) with values
in N×{1, . . . ,m}×APE such that kν →∞ and riν (pν , (yνj )) ≤ inf pν ·Xkνiν for
every ν. We can assume without any loss of generality that the sequence (iν)
is constant, say equal to i, and that the sequence (pν , (yνj )) converges to an
element (p¯, (y¯j)) in APE. Since ri(p¯, (y¯j)) > inf p¯ ·Xi from Assumption (R),
there exists xi ∈ Xi such that ri(p¯, (y¯j)) > p¯ ·xi. For ν large enough, xi ∈ Xkνi ,
therefore pν · xi ≥ inf pν · Xkνi ≥ ri(pν , (yνj )). Passing to the limit, one gets
p¯ · xi ≥ ri(p¯, (y¯j)), which leads to a contradiction.
For every k ≥ k0 and every i, we define the correspondences βki , ξki , ψki and
fki , from S × R into Xki , as follows:
βki (p, wi) = {xi ∈ Xki | p · xi ≤ wi},
ξki (p, wi) = {xi ∈ βki (p, wi) | x ¹i xi for every x ∈ βki (p, wi)},
ψki (p, wi) = {xi ∈ ξki (p, wi) | p · xi = max p · ξki (p, wi)},
fki (p, wi) =
ψ
k
i (p, wi) if wi > inf p ·Xki ,{
xi ∈ Xki | p · xi = inf p ·Xki
}
otherwise.
We then define the excess demand correspondence zk, from S ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj into
L, by:
zk(p, (yj)) =
∑m
i=1 f
k
i
(
p, ri(p, (yj))
)
− {∑nj=1 yj + ω} .
Let us now show that, for every k ≥ k0, the correspondence zk satisfies As-
sumption (ED). Indeed, from the properties of the fki [see Lemma 1 and 2
17
in Debreu (1962)], zk is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence with non-
empty, convex, compact values. Furthermore, for every (p, (yj)) ∈ S×∏nj=1 ∂Yj,
we have:
zk(p, (yj)) =
∑m
i=1 f
k
i
(
p, ri(p, (yj))
)
− {∑nj=1 yj + ω}
⊂ ∑mi=1Xki − {∑nj=1 yj + ω}
⊂ X − {∑nj=1 yj}
⊂ TX(∑nj=1 yj).
Finally, we deduce from (4) that, for every i,
fki
(
p, ri(p, (yj))
)
= ψki
(
p, ri(p, (yj))
)
for every (p, (yj)) ∈ APE. (5)
Hence, for every (p, (yj)) ∈ APE, since ψki (p, ri(p, (yj))) ⊂ βki (p, ri(p, (yj))),
we have:
sup p · zk(p, (yj)) = ∑mi=1 sup p · ψki (p, ri(p, (yj)))− p · (∑nj=1 yj + ω),
≤ ∑mi=1 (sup p · βki (p, ri(p, (yj)))− ri(p, (yj))) ,
≤ 0.
Consequently, from Theorem 2, for every k ≥ k0, there exists (pk, (ykj )) ∈
S ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj such that:
∑n
j=1 y
k
j ∈ X, (pk, . . . , pk) ∈ ϕ(pk, (ykj )) and zk(pk, (ykj )) ∩ −R+ e 6= ∅. (6)
Then, from the definition of zk, for every k ≥ k0 there exists (xki ) ∈
∏m
i=1X
k
i
and ρk ∈ R+ such that:
xki ∈ fki
(
pk, ri(p
k, (ykj ))
)
for every i, and
m∑
i=1
xki =
n∑
j=1
ykj + ω − ρke. (7)
The sequence ((xki ), p
k, (ykj ))k≥k0 takes its values in the compact set
∏m
i=1 X̂i×
APE. Therefore, we can assume without any loss of generality that it con-
verges to an element ((x∗i ), p
∗, (y∗j )) in
∏m
i=1 X̂i × APE.
We end the proof of Theorem 1 by showing that ((x∗i ), (y
∗
j ), p
∗) is an equilib-
rium of the economy E .
Since (p∗, (y∗j )) ∈ APE, we have (y∗j ) ∈
∏n
j=1 ∂Yj and (p
∗, . . . , p∗) ∈ ϕ(p∗, (y∗j )):
condition (b) of Definition 1 is satisfied.
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Since pk ∈ H we deduce from (5), (6), (7) and Assumption (R) that:
ρk = pk · (ρke)
= pk · (∑nj=1 ykj + ω −∑mi=1 xki )
= pk · (∑nj=1 ykj + ω)−∑mi=1 pk · xki
=
∑m
i=1
(
ri(p
k, (ykj ))− pk · xki
)
≥ 0.
We now show that ρk = 0 for every k ≥ k0. Suppose it is not true, then ρk > 0
and there is a consumer i for which pk ·xki < ri(pk, (ykj )). Since xki ∈ X̂i, we have
xki ≺i x0i , and xki ∈ ψki (pk, ri(pk, (ykj )) then implies pk ·x0i > ri(pk, (ykj )). Hence,
from the continuity of the scalar product, there exists xti = t x
0
i + (1 − t)xki
with t ∈ ]0, 1[ such that pk · xti = ri(pk, (ykj )). From the convexity of Xki
and of the binary preference relation ¹i [Assumption (C)], we deduce that
xti ∈ ξki (pk, ri(pk, (ykj ))). Then, since xki ∈ ψki (pk, ri(pk, (ykj )), we get pk · xki ≥
pk · xti = ri(pk, (yjk)), which leads to a contradiction. Finally, passing to the
limit in
∑m
i=1 x
k
i =
∑n
j=1 y
k
j +ω−ρk e, we get
∑m
i=1 x
∗
i =
∑n
j=1 y
∗
j +ω: condition
(c) of Definition 1 is satisfied.
Finally, we prove that condition (a) of Definition 1 is also satisfied. Suppose,
on the contrary, that it is not the case. Then there is a consumer i and xi ∈ Xi
such that p∗ · xi ≤ ri(p∗, (y∗j )) and x∗i ≺i xi. From the continuity of the binary
preference relation ¹i, and since ri(p∗, (y∗j )) > inf p∗ ·Xi, there exists x′i ∈ Xi
such that p∗ · x′i < ri(p∗, (y∗j )) and x∗i ≺i x′i. Consequently, for k large enough,
we have pk ·x′i < ri(pk, (ykj )), xki ≺i x′i and x′i ∈ Xki , which contradicts the fact
that xki ∈ ψki (pk, ri(pk, (ykj ))) ⊂ ξki (pk, ri(pk, (ykj ))). uunionsq
4 Existence of marginal pricing equilibria
In this section we shall consider the existence problem of a marginal pricing
equilibrium. Firms are said to follow the marginal pricing rule if they fulfill
the first order necessary condition for their profit maximization, in the precise
mathematical sense formalized by Clarke’s normal cone [see Cornet (1989)].
Let us recall the definition of the Clarke’s tangent and normal cones [see Clarke
(1975,1983)]. If Y is a nonempty subset of L and y is an element in clY , then
Clarke’s tangent cone to Y at y is:
TY (y) =
v ∈ L ∀(y
ν) ⊂ Y, (yν)→ y, ∀(tν) ⊂ R∗+, (tν)→ 0,∃(vν) ⊂ L :
(vν)→ v and yν + tν vν ∈ Y for ν large enough.
 .
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Clarke’s normal cone to Y at y, denoted by NY (y), is then the negative polar
cone of TY (y).
When Y is closed and convex, Clarke’s tangent and normal cones to Y at y
reduce to those of convex analysis:
TY (y) = cl{λ (y′ − y) | λ ≥ 0 and y′ ∈ Y },
NY (y) = {p ∈ L | p · y ≥ p · y′ for every y′ ∈ Y }.
In the following, we shall denote by MP the marginal pricing rule, the corre-
spondence from P ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj into (e+)n defined by:
MP (p, (yj)) =
∏n
j=1NYj(yj).
Remark that, under Assumption (P), the marginal pricing rule MP satifies
Assumption (PR) from the properties of the Clarke’s normal cone [see Cornet
(1989)]. Morover, the free-disposal condition implies that MP (p, (yj)) \ {0} ⊂
P n for every (p, (yj)) ∈ P ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj.
However, the marginal pricing rule does not need to generate bounded losses,
unless the production sets are all star-shaped [see Bonnisseau and Cornet
(1988)]. We shall thus replace Assumption (BLS) by the following one:
Assumption (BS)
There exists a real number t0 > Θ(0) such that At0 is nonempty and bounded,
and, for every real number t ∈ [0, t0] and every (p, (yj)) ∈ PE, if (yj) ∈ At,
then p · (∑nj=1 yj + te) > inf p ·X.
Even if the marginal pricing rule may generate unbounded losses, we deduce
the existence of a marginal pricing equilibrium from Theorem 1. Using an
idea of Bonnisseau (1992), we show the existence of a general pricing rule
with bounded losses, which coincides with the marginal pricing rule on the set
of attainable productions.
Theorem 3 The economy E = (L, (Xi,¹i, ri), (Yj),MP, ω) has an equilib-
rium under Assumptions (P), (C), (R) and (BS).
Proof: Let us first recall that, under Assumptions (P) and (C), if we let
Y0 = −X = − (∑mi=1Xi +D − ω), then, for every j = 0, 1, . . . , n, there exists
a Lipschitz continuous function λj : e
⊥ → R satisfying sj − λj(sj) e ∈ ∂Yj for
every sj ∈ e⊥. Moreover, for every j = 0, 1, . . . , n, the application Λj : e⊥ →
∂Yj defined by Λj(sj) = sj−λj(sj) e is an homeomorphism [see Lemma 2]. We
also recall that the function θ, defined for every s = (sj) ∈ (e⊥)n by θ(s) =∑n
j=1 λj(sj)+λ0(−
∑n
j=1 sj), is Lipschitz continuous and that, for every t ≥ 0,
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the inverse image Mt of At under the application Λ : s 7→ Λ(s) = (Λj(sj))
satisfies Mt = {s ∈ (e⊥)n | θ(s) ≤ t}.
The following generalization of Lemma 4.2 in Bonnisseau and Cornet (1990a)
[see the proof in Appendix] shows the link between the generalized gradients
of the functions λj and Clarke’s normal cones to the production sets.
Lemma 4 Let Yj be a nonempty, closed subset of L, different from L, satisfy-
ing Yj −D ⊂ Yj, and let λj be the function from e⊥ to R defined in Lemma 2.
Then the generalized gradient of λj at s ∈ e⊥ is given by:
∂λj(sj) = (NYj(Λj(sj)) ∩ S)− {(1/‖e‖2)e},
and the correspondence ∂λj, from e
⊥ into itself, is upper hemi-continuous with
non-empty, convex, compact values.
Consequently, from Clarke (1983) (Propositions 2.3.3 and 2.3.10), for every
s = (sj) ∈ (e⊥)n we have:
∂θ(s) ⊂ ∆(s) : =
 (p1 − p, . . . , pn − p) p ∈ −NX(−Λ0(−
∑n
j=1 sj)) ∩ S
(pj) ∈MP (p,Λ(s)) ∩ Sn
 ,
and, from Clarke’s normal cone properties, ∆ is an upper hemi-continuous
correspondence from (e⊥)n into itself with non-empty, convex, compact values.
Furthermore, from Assumption (BS), 0 /∈ ∆(s) for every s ∈ (e⊥)n such that
0 ≤ θ(s) ≤ t0.
Since t0 > Θ(0), we have coM0 ⊂ intMt0 . Let r = infs/∈Mt0 ‖s − projcoM0(s)‖
and M = coM0 + r2B(e⊥)n(0, 1). M is a non-empty, convex, compact subset
of (e⊥)n such that M0 ⊂ intM and M⊂ intMt0 [see Figure 1].
We can now apply the following topological lemma [see the proof in Appendix],
with a = 0 and b = t0.
Lemma 5 Let E be a finite-dimensional Euclidean space, let a, b ∈ R such
that a < b, let θ : E → R be a locally Lipschitz continuous function, and let ∆
be a correspondence from E into itself. Suppose that:
(i) the set Mab := {s ∈ E | a ≤ θ(s) ≤ b} is non-empty and compact;
(ii) ∆ is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence with non-empty, convex,
compact values, satisfying ∂θ(s) ⊂ ∆(s) for every s ∈ E;
(iii) 0 /∈ ∆(s) for every s ∈Mab.
If M is a closed, convex, compact subset of E such that Ma ⊂ intM ⊂ Mb,
then there exists a continuous (homotopy) mapping H : ∂M× [0, 1]→ E such
that, for every s ∈ ∂M,
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(I) infH(s, 0) ·∆(s) > 0;
(II) H(s, 1) ∈ −intTM(s);
(III) H(s, t) 6= 0 for every t ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, there exists a continuous mapping H : ∂M× [0, 1] → (e⊥)n satisfying
conditions (I), (II), and (III) of Lemma 5 for every s ∈ ∂M. Let H˜ be the
mapping from ∂M× [0, 1] to (e⊥)n defined by:
H˜(s, t) =
H(s, t)
maxj ‖H(s, t)j‖ .
H˜ is well defined since H(s, t) 6= 0 for every (s, t) ∈ ∂M× [0, 1]. Moreover, H˜
satisfies conditions (I), (II), and (III) of Lemma 5: for every (s, t) ∈ ∂M×[0, 1],
inf H˜(s, 0) ·∆(s) > 0 (8)
H˜(s, 1) ∈ −intTM(s) (9)
H˜(s, t) 6= 0 (10)
We also define the function σ, from (e⊥)n to [0, 1], by:
σ(s) =

0 if s ∈M
2
r
‖projM(s)− s‖ if s ∈ B(e⊥)n(M, r2) \M
1 if s 6∈ B(e⊥)n(M, r2)
,
where projM denotes the projection mapping onto M. Note that, from the
definition of r, we have B(e⊥)n(M, r2) = B(e⊥)n(coM0, r) ⊂Mt0 .
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Finally, for every (p, (yj)) ∈ P × ∏nj=1 ∂Yj, let s = (sj) = (proje⊥(yj)). Then
ϕ(p, (yj)) is equal to MP (p, (yj)) if s ∈ intM, to
co
{
MP (p, (yj)),
{
λ
(
1
p·e(p, . . . , p) + H˜(s, 0)
)
λ ≥ 0
}}
if s ∈ ∂M and to
{
λ
(
1
p·e(p, . . . , p) + H˜(projM(s), σ(s))
)
λ ≥ 0
}
if s 6∈ M.
We now show that ϕ satisfies Assumption (PR). Since H˜ and σ are continuous
and the pricing rule MP satisfies Assumption (PR) under Assumption (P),
ϕ is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence from S × ∏nj=1 ∂Yj into Hn.
Moreover, for every (p, (yj)) ∈ P ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj, ϕ(p, (yj)) is a nonempty, closed,
convex cone of vertex 0, different from {0}, and ϕ(λp, (yj)) = ϕ(p, (yj)) for
every λ > 0. Note that ϕ =MP on M0 and MP takes their values in P
n.
Consequently, the correspondence ϕ satisfies Assumption (PR).
From Assumption (BS), there exists t0 ≥ 0 such that At0 is nonempty and
bounded. Let us now check that the pricing rule ϕ satisfies parts (BS) and
(BL) of Assumption (BLS).
Let t ∈ [0, t0[ and (p, (yj)) ∈ S × ∏nj=1 ∂Yj such that (p, . . . , p) ∈ ϕ(p, (yj))
and
∑n
j=1 yj + te ∈ ∂X. Then s = (Λ−1j (yj)) ∈ M from the construction
of ϕ and (10). We now distinguish two cases. Let us first suppose that s ∈
intM; then ϕ is the marginal pricing rule MP , which satisfies Part (BS) of
Assumption (BLS) under Assumption (BS).
Suppose now that s ∈ ∂M. If p · (∑nj=1 yj + te) = inf p · X, then p ∈
−NX(∑nj=1 yj + te) and ∑nj=1 yj + te = −Λ0(−∑nj=1 sj). Furthermore, there
exists (qj) ∈ ∏nj=1(NYj(yj) ∩ S) and λ ∈ [0, 1] such that p = λqj + (1− λ)(p+
H˜(s, 0)j) for every j. Hence, (1 − λ)H˜(s, 0) = −λ(q1 − p, . . . , qn − p) with
(q1−p, . . . , qn−p) ∈ ∆(s). Since 0 /∈ ∆(s) and H˜(s, 0) 6= 0, we have λ ∈ ]0, 1[,
and H˜(s, 0) = − λ
1−λδ with δ ∈ ∆(s). Consequently, H˜(s, 0) · δ < 0, which
contradicts (8). Thus, ϕ satisfies Part (BS) of Assumption (BLS).
Let us now come to part (BL). Let t ∈ [t0,Θ(t0)], (p, (yj)) ∈ S × At such
that p ∈ −NX(∑nj=1 yj + te), and let (qj) ∈ ϕ(p, (yj)). From (9), if we let
sˆ = s′ − εH˜(s′, 1) with s = (Λ−1(yj)) and s′ = projM(s), then sˆ ∈ intM ⊂
Mt0 for ε > 0 small enough. Let then (yˆj) = Λ(sˆ); we have (yˆj) ∈ At0 .
Since (yj) ∈ At with t ≥ t0, we have s 6∈ intB(e⊥)n(M, r2), and ϕ(p, (yj)) =
{(p, . . . , p) + H˜(s′, 1)}. Consequently, qj = p + H˜(s′, 1)j for every j, and we
can write:
∑n
j=1 qj · (yj − yˆj) =
∑n
j=1 p · (yj − yˆj) +
∑n
j=1 H˜(s
′, 1)j · (yj − yˆj).
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We then have:
∑n
j=1 qj · yj =
∑n
j=1 p · yj +
∑n
j=1(qj − p) · yˆj +
∑
j H˜(s
′, 1)j · (yj − yˆj),
and, since H˜ takes its values in (e⊥)n:
∑n
j=1 H˜(s
′, 1)j · (yj − yˆj) = ∑nj=1 H˜(s′, 1)j · (sj − sˆj)
= H˜(s′, 1) · (s− sˆ)
= H˜(s′, 1) · (s− s′) + ε‖H˜(s′, 1)‖2.
From (10), we have H˜(s′, 1) 6= 0, hence ε‖H˜(s′, 1)‖ > 0. Moreover, since s′ =
projM(s), s− s′ ∈ NM(s), and (9) implies that H˜(s′, 1) · (s− s′) > 0. Finally,
we get H˜(s′, 1)·(s−sˆ) > 0. Therefore,∑nj=1 qj ·yj > ∑nj=1 p·yj+∑nj=1(qj−p)·yˆj
and ϕ satisfies part (BL) of Assumption (BLS).
From Theorem 1, the economy E˜ = (L, (Xi,¹i, ri), (Yj), ϕ, ω) has an equili-
brium and, recalling that, if (p, (yj)) ∈ S × A0, then s ∈ M0 ⊂ intM and
ϕ(p, (yj)) =MP (p, (yj)), every equilibrium of E˜ is a marginal pricing equilib-
rium of E . uunionsq
5 Existence of quasi-equilibria
We propose in this section to weaken the survival assumption [part (BS) of
Assumption (BLS) in the case of general pricing rules, or Assumption (BS)
when the firms follow the marginal pricing rule], by assuming that it is satisfied
only for positive real numbers t ∈]0, t0[. From the example in Kamiya (1988)
we now that there may exists no equilibrium when the survival assumption is
not satisfied. However, we show in this section that a quasi-equilibrium can
be found when the survival assumption is not satisfied for t = 0, that is just
on the boundary of the attainable allocation, but for t ∈]0, t0[.
With respect to the standard Walras equilibrium model, the difference is the
same as supposing that the initial endowments are in the interior of the con-
sumption sets or only in the consumption sets. We know that this little dif-
ference may have important effects on the equilibrium analysis since a Walras
equilibrium may fail to exist under the weak survival assumption, which has
the advantage to be more realistic since most of the consumers have an initial
endowments in only one commodity, the labor.
Often, the existence of an equilibrium is deduced from a quasi-equilibrium
under some irreductibility assumption on the economy.
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Let us first give the definition of a quasi-equilibrium.
Definition 2 A quasi-equilibrium of the economy E is an element ((x∗i ), (y∗j ), p∗)
in Lm × Ln × S satisfying:
(q-a) for every i, x∗i ∈ Bi(p∗, (y∗j )) and, for every xi ∈ Xi such that p∗ · xi <
ri(p
∗, (y∗j )), xi ¹i x∗i ;
(b) for every j, y∗j ∈ ∂Yj, and (p∗, . . . , p∗) ∈ ϕ(p∗, (y∗j ));
(c)
∑m
i=1 x
∗
i =
∑n
j=1 y
∗
j + ω.
Allowing for the survival assumption not to be satisfied for t = 0 implies
that the total wealth in the economy, evaluated at an attainable production
equilibrium (p, (yj)) ∈ APE may be equal to inf p ·∑mi=1Xi. We thus have to
weaken our Assumption (R) to be consistent with this case.
Assumption (R’)
For every i, ri is continuous on S×∏nj=1 ∂Yj and satisfies ri(p, (yj)) ≥ inf p·Xi
for every (p, (yj)) ∈ APE. Furthermore, ∑mi=1 ri(p, (yj)) = p · (∑nj=1 yj + ω)
for every (p, (yj)) ∈ PE.
We also have to slightly strengthen Assumption (PR) to assume that the
pricing rule takes its values in Sn not only for the attainable allocations but
also in a neighborhood. So, we posit:
Assumption (PR)
For every (p, (yj)) ∈ P × ∏nj=1 ∂Yj, ϕ(p, (yj)) is a nonempty, closed, convex
cone of vertex 0, different from {0}, included in (e+)n, and ϕ(λp, (yj)) =
ϕ(p, (yj)) for every λ > 0. There exists t¯ > 0 such that ϕ(p, (yj)) ⊂ Sn for
every (p, (yj)) ∈ S×At¯ and ϕ is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence on
S ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj with nonempty, convex, compact values in Hn.
In the general case, Assumption (BLS) will be replaced by the following one:
Assumption (BLS’)
There exists a real number t0 > 0 such that At0 is nonempty and bounded,
and:
(BS’) for every real number t ∈]0, t0[ and every (p, (yj)) ∈ PE, if ∑nj=1 yj +
te ∈ X, then p · (∑nj=1 yj + te) > inf p ·X;
(BL) for every real number t ∈ [t0,Θ(t0)], every (p, (yj)) ∈ S ×At and every
(qj) ∈ ϕ(p, (yj), if p ∈ −NX(∑nj=1 yj + te), then there exists (yˆj) ∈ At0 such
that
∑n
j=1(qj − p) · (yj − yˆj) > 0.
In the particular case of marginal pricing, we shall replace Assumption (BS)
by the following:
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Assumption (BS’)
There exists t0 > Θ(0) such that At0 is nonempty and bounded, and, for every
real number t ∈]0, t0] and every (p, (yj)) ∈ PE, if ∑nj=1 yj + te ∈ X, then
p · (∑nj=1 yj + te) > inf p ·X.
Note that the difference comes from the fact that we do not assume that
the total wealth of the production sector (p · ∑nj=1 yj) is strictly above the
subsistence level of the consumers (inf p ·X) when the total production is on
the boundary of X.
We can now state the following result.
Theorem 4 The economy E = (L, (Xi,¹i, ri), (Yj), ϕ, ω) has a quasi-equili-
brium under Assumptions (P), (C) and (R’) if ϕ satisfies Assumptions (PR’)
and (BLS’) or if ϕ =MP satisfies Assumption (BS’).
The proof of Theorem 4 is divided into two steps.
5.1 Step 1
In this first step, we shall construct auxiliary economies satisfying the condi-
tions of Theorem 1 or of Theorem 3 if ϕ =MP .
Let ν ∈ N∗, large enough so that 1/ν < min{t0, t¯}, where t0 comes from
Assumption (BLS’) or (BS’) and t¯ from Assumption (PR’). Let ων = ω+(1/ν)e
and Xν :=
∑m
i=1Xi+D−ων = X−{(1/ν)e}. Under Assumption (C), we can
apply Lemma 2 to the set Y ν0 = −Xν : for every s ∈ e⊥, there exists a unique
real number λν0(s) such that s−λν0(s)e ∈ ∂Y ν0 , and the function λν0 is Lipschitz
continuous on e⊥. Note that the definition of Xν and the unicity property
imply that λν0(s) = λ0(s)− (1/ν) for every s ∈ e⊥. For every s = (sj) ∈ (e⊥)n,
we let θν(s) :=
∑n
j=1 λj(sj) + λ
ν
0(−
∑n
j=1 sj) = θ(s)− (1/ν).
For every t ≥ 0, we let:
Aνt :=
{
(yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 ∂Yj ∑nj=1 yj ∈ Xν
}
= At+(1/ν),
and M νt := Λ
−1(Aνt ) =Mt+(1/ν). For every t ≥ 0, we have:
M νt =
{
s ∈ (e⊥)n θν(s) ≤ t
}
,
and we let Θν(t) := max{θν(s) | s ∈ coM νt } = Θ(t+ (1/ν))− (1/ν).
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We finally let
APEν :=
{
(p, (yj)) ∈ PE (yj) ∈ Aν0
}
,
τ ν = min
{
−(1/ν), min
1≤i≤m
{inf ri(APEν)− inf p ·Xi}
}
,
and, for every i and every (p, (yj)) ∈ APEν :
ανi (p, (yj)) = max{inf p ·Xi, ri(p, (yj)) +mτ ν},
ανi (p, (yj)) = ri(p, (yj))− 2τ ν .
The following lemma [see the proof in Appendix] gathers some properties of
convergence that will be needed in Step 2 when passing to the limit.
Lemma 6 For every ν ∈ N∗, τ ν < 0, and the sequence (τ ν)ν converges to 0.
We now construct wealth functions (rνi ), which satisfies Assumption (R) in-
stead of Assumption (R’). For this, we consider, for every ν large enough, the
correspondences T ν1 and T
ν
2 from S ×
∏n
j=1 ∂Yj into Rm, defined as follows:
T ν1 (p, (yj)) =

∏m
i=1]α
ν
i (p, (yj)), α
ν
i (p, (yj))[ if (p, (yj)) ∈ APEν
Rm otherwise
,
T ν2 (p, (yj)) =
{
(ρi) ∈ Rm ∑mi=1 ρi = p · (∑nj=1 yj + ων)
}
.
The correspondence T ν1 has nonempty, convex values since τ
ν < 0 and ri(p, (yj))−
τ ν ≥ inf p ·Xi for all i and all (p, (yj)) ∈ APEν . Furthermore, T ν1 has an open
graph, since ανi is continuous and α
ν
i is upper semi-continuous.
T ν2 is lower hemi-continuous with nonempty, convex values. Consequently, their
intersection T ν = T ν1 ∩ T ν2 is a lower hemi-continuous correspondence from
S ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj into Rm with convex values.
We also show that T ν(p, (yj)) 6= ∅ for every (p, (yj)) ∈ S × ∏nj=1 ∂Yj. It is
obvious for every (p, (yj)) 6∈ APEν . If (p, (yj)) ∈ APEν , then p · (∑nj=1 yj +
ων) > inf p · X from Part (BS’) of Assumption (BLS’) or from Assumption
(BS’) if ϕ = MP , and
∑m
i=1 ri(p, (yj)) = p · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω) from Assumption
(R’). Since τ ν ≤ − 1
ν
, p · (∑nj=1 yj + ων) < ∑mi=1 ανi (p, (yj)).
We now show that
∑m
i=1 α
ν
i (p, (yj)) < p · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω
ν). If ri(p, (yj)) +mτ
ν ≤
inf p · Xi for all i, then, recalling that p ∈ S from Assumption (R’), one has
inf p · D = 0 and inf p · X = ∑mi=1 inf p · Xi. Consequently, ∑mi=1 ανi (p, (yj) =∑m
i=1 inf p ·Xi < p · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω
ν). If for some ıˆ, rˆı(p, (yj)) +mτ
ν > inf p ·Xıˆ,
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then ∑m
i=1 α
ν
i (p, (yj) = rˆı(p, (yj)) +mτ
ν +
∑
i6=ıˆ ανi (p, (yj)
= rˆı(p, (yj)) + τ
ν +
∑
i6=ıˆ(ανi (p, (yj) + τ
ν).
From the definition of τ ν , we have ανi (p, (yj) + τ
ν ≤ ri(p, (yj)) for all i. Hence∑m
i=1 α
ν
i (p, (yj) ≤
∑m
i=1 ri(p, (yj)) < p · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω
ν).
From the mean value theorem, there exists a convex combination (ανi (p, (yj)))
of (ανi (p, (yj))) and (α
ν
i (p, (yj))) in T
ν
1 (p, (yj)) such that
∑m
i=1 α
ν
i (p, (yj) = p ·
(
∑n
j=1 yj + ω
ν).
Finally T ν is a lower hemi-continuous correspondence from S ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj into
Rm with nonempty, convex values. From Michael’s theorem, there exists a
continuous selection rν = (rνi ) of T
ν , satisfying:
∑m
i=1 r
ν
i (p, (yj)) = p · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω
ν) for every (p, (yj)) ∈ PE (11)
and, for every i:
rνi (p, (yj)) > inf p ·Xi for every (p, (yj)) ∈ APEν , (12)
Let us now consider the auxiliary economy Eν = ((Xi,¹i, rνi ), (Yj), ϕ, ων).
Assumptions (P) and (C) are clearly satisfied in Eν . Assumption (R) is also
satisfied in Eν from (11), (12) and the continuity of rν .
Let us first consider the case of a general pricing rule. When 1/ν ≤ t¯, Eν
satisfies Assumption (PR) since E satisfies Assumption (PR). Let us now come
to Assumpton (BLS). If we let tν0 = t0 − (1/ν), then tν0 ≥ 0 since 1/ν ≤ t¯0,
and Aνtν0 = At0 is nonempty and bounded. For every t ∈ [0, tν0[ and every
(p, (yj)) ∈ PE, if∑nj=1 yj+te ∈ Xν , then (yj) ∈ Aνt = At+(1/ν) with t+(1/ν) ∈
[(1/ν), tν0[⊂]0, t0[. We then deduce from Assumption (BLS’) that p · (
∑n
j=1 yj+
(t+(1/ν))e)) > inf p ·X, which clearly implies p · (∑nj=1 yj + te) > inf p ·Xν =
inf p ·X − (1/ν). For every t ∈ [tν0,Θν(tν0)], every (p, (yj)) ∈ S ×Aνt and every
(qj) ∈ ϕ(p, (yj)), if p ∈ −NXν (∑nj=1 yj + te), then p ∈ −NX(∑nj=1 yj + (t +
(1/ν))e) with (yj) ∈ At+(1/ν) and t + (1/ν) ∈ [tν0 + (1/ν),Θν(tν0) + (1/ν)] =
[t0,Θ(t0)]. We then deduce from Assumption (BLS’) that there exists (yˆj) ∈
At0 = A
ν
tν0
such that
∑n
j=1(qj − p) · (yj − yˆj) > 0.
In the case where ϕ =MP and Assumption (BS’) is satisfied in the economy
E , Assumption (BS) is also satisfied in the economy Eν for ν such that tν0 =
t0 − (1/ν) > Θν(0) = Θ(1/ν) − (1/ν). We first show that tν0 > Θν(0) for
ν large enough. Suppose on the contrary that tν0 ≤ Θν(0), i.e. that t0 ≤
Θ(1/ν) for every ν ∈ N∗. For ν large enough, M1/ν is a subset of Mt0 , which
is compact under Assumptions (P), (C) and (BS’). From the definition of
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the function Θ, there exists sν ∈ coM1/ν such that Θ(1/ν) = θ(sν). From
Carathodory’s theorem, there exists then m(`−1)+1 vectors (sνk) inM1/ν and
λν in the simplex of Rm(`−1)+1, such that sν = ∑k λνksνk. From the compacity
of the Mt0 and the compacity of the simplex, we can suppose without any loss
of generality that, the sequence (sνk)ν converges to (s¯k) ∈ M0 and that the
sequence (λν)ν converges to λ¯. Consequently, the sequence (s
ν)ν converges to
s¯ :=
∑
k λ¯ks¯k ∈ coM0. Since the function θ is continuous, passing to the limit
in t0 ≤ θ(sν) we get t0 ≤ θ(s¯), which contradicts the fact that Θ(0) < t0.
Consequently, for ν large enough, we have tν0 > Θ
ν(0).
Note that Aνtν0 = At0 is nonempty and bounded. Furthermore, for every t ∈
[0, tν0] and every (p, (yj)) ∈ PE, if (yj) ∈ Aνt , then (yj) ∈ At+(1/ν) with t +
(1/ν) ∈]0, t0], and we deduce from Assumption (BS’) that p ·∑nj=1 yj + (t +
(1/ν))e) > inf p ·X, which implies p · (∑nj=1 yj + t) > inf p ·Xν .
Hence, for ν large enough, from Theorems 1 and 3, there exists an equilibrium
in the economy Eν , i.e. there exists ((xνi ), (yνj ), pν) in Lm × Ln × S such that,
if we let Bνi (p
ν , (yνj )) = {xi ∈ Xi | pν · xi ≤ rνi (pν , (yνj ))}, then:
for every i, xνi is a greater element for ¹i in Bνi (pν , (yνj )), (13)
for every j, yνj ∈ ∂Yj and (pν , . . . , pν) ∈ ϕ(pν , (yνj )), (14)∑m
i=1 x
ν
i =
∑n
j=1 y
ν
j + ω +
1
ν
e. (15)
5.2 Step 2
In this section we show that the sequence of equilibria of the economies Eν
converges to a quasi-equilibrium of the initial economy E .
From (15) we deduce that, for ν large enough, ((xνi ), (y
ν
j ), p
ν) belongs to the set
X̂t0 ×At0 ×S, where X̂t0 = {(xi) ∈
∏m
i=1Xi | ∃d ∈ D :
∑m
i=1 xi+ d−ω ∈ Kt0},
with Kt0 = {
∑n
j=1 yj + t0e | (yj) ∈ At0} ⊂ X. Under Assumptions (P), (C)
and (BLS’) or (BS’), if ϕ =MP the set At0 is compact, and Kt0 is a compact
subset of X. From Lemma 1, X̂t0 is compact, and we can suppose without any
loss of generality that the sequence ((xνi ), (y
ν
j ), p
ν)ν converges to an element
((x∗i ), (y
∗
j ), p
∗) ∈ X̂t0 × At0 × S. Let us now check that ((x∗i ), (y∗j ), p∗) is a
quasi-equilibrium of E .
Passing to the limit in (15), we get:
∑m
i=1 x
∗
i =
∑n
j=1 y
∗
j + ω: ((x
∗
i ), (y
∗
j ), p
∗)
satisfies condition (c) of Definition 1.
For every j, since Yj is closed, y
∗
j ∈ ∂Yj. Furthermore, since ϕ is an up-
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per hemi-continuous correspondence [under Assumption (P) if ϕ = MP ; un-
der Assumption (PR) otherwise], from (14) we get (p∗, . . . , p∗) ∈ ϕ(p∗, (y∗j )):
((x∗i ), (y
∗
j ), p
∗) satisfies condition (b) of Definition 2.
For every i, since Xi is closed, x
∗
i ∈ Xi. Furthermore, for every i, since
xνi ∈ Bνi (pν , (yνj )) for ν large enough, (pν , (yνj )) ∈ APEν and rνi (p, (yj)) <
ανi (p, (yj)) for every (p, (yj)) ∈ APEν by construction, we deduce that pν ·
xνi < ri(p
ν , (yνj )) − 2τ ν for ν large enough. From the continuity of ri [un-
der Assumption (R’)] and the fact that the sequence (τ ν)ν converges to 0
(Lemma 6), we finally get p∗ · x∗i ≤ ri(p∗, (y∗j )), that is xi ∈ Bi(p∗, (y∗j )). Sup-
pose now that there is a consumer i for which there exists xi ∈ Xi such that
p∗ · xi < ri(p∗, (y∗j )) and x∗i ≺i xi. Then, from the continuity of ri and ¹i and
from the fact that the sequence (τ ν)ν converges to 0, for ν large enough we
have pν ·xi < ri(pν , (yνj ))+mτ ν < rνi (pν , (yνj )) and xνi ≺i xi, which contradicts
(13). Thus, ((x∗i ), (y
∗
j ), p
∗) satisfies condition (q-a) of Definition 2. uunionsq
Appendix: Lemmata
Proof of Lemma 1: First of all, remark that, since D and the consumption sets
Xi are nonempty and convex from Assumption (C), the set X =
∑m
i=1Xi +D − ω
is nonempty and convex. Moreover, it clearly satisfies X +D = X.
Let us now show that X is closed. From Assumption (C), the cones AXi, for all
i, and D are included in e+. So, one easily checks that they are positively semi-
independant, and this implies that X =
∑m
i=1Xi + D − ω is closed [see (9) in
Paragraph 1.9 in Debreu (1959)].
Suppose now that there is a consumer i for which inf e ·Xi = −∞. Then there exists
a sequence (xνi )ν taking its values in Xi satisfying e·xi ≤ 0 for every ν and such that
the sequence (‖xνi ‖)ν converges to +∞. For every ν, let ξνi = x
ν
i
‖xνi ‖ . The sequence (ξ
ν
i )
clearly takes its values in the compact subset AXi ∩BL(0, 1). We can thus suppose
without any loss of generality that it converges to some ξi ∈ AXi ∩BL(0, 1). From
‖ξνi ‖ = 1 we deduce that ‖ξi‖ = 1, hence ξi 6= 0. From ξi ∈ AXi, since AXi ⊂ e+,
we finally deduce that e · ξi > 0. But, since e · xνi ≤ 0 for every ν, we get e · ξi ≤ 0,
which is a contradiction. Consequently, we have ti = inf e · Xi > −∞ for every i,
i.e. Xi ⊂ {tie}+ e+ for every i. Hence, X =
∑m
i=1Xi+D−ω ⊂ {
∑m
i=1 ti−ω}+ e+,
and X 6= L.
Let nowK be a compact subset ofX. In order to show that the set AK = {((xi), d) ∈∏m
i=1Xi × D |
∑m
i=1 xi + d − ω ∈ K} is compact, we shall first prove that it is
bounded. Let ((xνi ), d
ν) be a sequence in
∏m
i=1Xi×D such that
∑m
i=1 x
ν
i +d
ν−ω =
kν ∈ K for every ν. Suppose that ‖((xνi ), dν)‖∞ = max{maxi{‖xνi ‖}, ‖dν‖} tends
to +∞. For every ν, let ξνi = x
ν
i
‖((xνi ),dν)‖∞ for every i and δ
ν = d
ν
‖((xνi ),dν)‖∞ . Since‖((ξνi ), δν)‖∞ = 1 for every ν, we can suppose that the sequence ((ξi), δν) converges
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to some ((ξi), δ) ∈ Lm ×D satisfying ‖((ξi), δ)‖ = 1. Note that ξi 6= 0 implies that
‖xνi ‖ tends to +∞, and consequently, ξi ∈ AXi.
Since K is compact and kν ∈ K for every ν, passing to the limit in ∑mi=1 ξνi + δν −
ω
‖((xνi ),dν)‖∞ =
kν
‖((xνi ),dν)‖∞ we get
∑m
i=1 ξi+δ = 0, which implies that ξi = 0 for every
i and δ = 0 from the positive semi-independence of the cones AX1, . . . ,AXM , D.
Finally, ((ξi), δ) = 0 contradicts the fact that ‖((ξi), δ)‖ = 1.
We now finish the proof by showing that AK is closed. Let ((xνi ), d
ν) be a sequence
in
∏m
i=1Xi×D converging to ((xi), d), and, such that
∑m
i=1 x
ν
i +d
ν−ω = kν ∈ K for
every ν. Since the sets Xi and D are closed, ((xi), d) ∈
∏m
i=1Xi ×D. Furthermore,
since K is compact, (kν) has a sub-sequence, which converges to k ∈ K. Thus,∑m
i=1 xi + d− ω = kand ((xi), d) ∈ AK . uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 2: We shall omit the subscript j for the sake of clarity.
We first establish that, for every s ∈ e⊥, there exists a real number λ such that
s − λe ∈ ∂Y . Indeed, let y′, y′′ be elements in L such that y′ ∈ Y and y′′ 6∈ Y . Let
t ≥ −min{p · (y′− s) | p ∈ S}. Then s− te ∈ Y . Indeed, it suffices to show from the
free-disposal assumption that s− te ∈ y′ −D or equivalently that y′ − s+ te ∈ D.
From the Bipolar Theorem [see Theorem 14.5 in Rockafellar (1970)], this is true if
for all p ∈ S, p · (y′− s+ te) ≥ 0. This last condition holds true from our choice of t.
Let t < min{p · (s − y′′) | p ∈ S}. Then s − te 6∈ Y . Indeed, it suffices to show
from the free-disposal assumption that s − te ∈ y′′ + intD or equivalently that
s − y′′ − te ∈ intD. This is true if for all p ∈ S, p · (s − y′′ − te) > 0. This last
condition holds true from our choice of t.
Finally, the set {t ∈ R | s − te ∈ Y } is non-empty and bounded below. We let
λ = inf{t ∈ R | s− te ∈ Y }. One checks that s− λe ∈ ∂Y since e ∈ intD.
We now show simultaneously the uniqueness part and the fact that the function λ
is Lipschitz continuous. Let s1, s2 be elements in e⊥ and let λ1 and λ2 such that
y1 = s1−λ1e ∈ ∂Y and y2 = s2−λ2e ∈ ∂Y . Without any loss of generality, we can
assume that λ1 ≥ λ2. Suppose that y1 − y2 ∈ −intD. Then y1 ∈ y2 − intD ⊂ intY ,
which contradicts the fact that y1 ∈ ∂Y . Thus, we have y1− y2 6∈ −intD, and there
exists p ∈ S such that p · (y1− y2) ≥ 0. This implies p · (s1− s2) + λ2− λ1 ≥ 0 since
p · e = 1. Hence:
| λ1 − λ2 |= λ1 − λ2 ≤ p · (s1 − s2) ≤ max{q · (s1 − s2) | q ∈ S}.
The function from e⊥ to R, which associates max{q · σ | q ∈ S} to σ, is a finite,
convex, homogeneous of degree 1 function. Consequently, it is locally Lipschitz con-
tinuous at 0 and with the homogeneity, one deduces that it is Lipschitz continuous
on e⊥. Consequently, there exists k ≥ 0 such that max{q · σ | q ∈ S} ≤ k‖σ‖ for all
σ ∈ e⊥. Finally, one gets | λ1 − λ2 |≤ k‖s1 − s2‖.
This shows firstly that, for every s ∈ e⊥, the element λ(s) is uniquely defined since
s1 = s2 implies that λ1 = λ2. Secondly, this shows that the function λ : e⊥ → R is
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Lipschitz continuous of rank k.
Let us now establish the fact that Y = {y ∈ L | λ(proje⊥(y)) + (y · e/‖e‖2) ≤ 0}.
Indeed, if y ∈ Y , then one has y = proje⊥(y) + (y · e/‖e‖2)e, and the definition of λ
implies that λ(proje⊥(y)) ≤ −(y ·e/‖e‖2). Conversely, if λ(proje⊥(y))+(y ·e/‖e‖2) ≤
0, then one has
y = proje⊥(y) +
y·e
‖e‖2 e = proje⊥(y)− λ(proje⊥(y))e+
(
λ(proje⊥(y)) +
y·e
‖e‖2
)
e.
Since proje⊥(y)− λ(proje⊥(y))e ∈ ∂Y and Y − R+e ⊂ Y , this implies that y ∈ Y .
We end the proof by showing that the mapping Λ : s → s − λ(s)e has proje⊥|∂Y ,
the restriction to ∂Y of the orthogonal projection onto e⊥, for inverse. One clearly
has proje⊥ (s− λ(s)e) = s for every s ∈ e⊥, and we now show that proje⊥(y) −
λ (proje⊥(y)) e = y for every y ∈ ∂Y . Indeed, one has y = proje⊥(y) − te with
t = − y·e‖e‖2 and the above uniqueness property and the fact that y ∈ ∂Y imply that
λ(proje⊥(y)) = t. uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 3: Let us first show part (BL) of Lemma 3. If for all γ > 0, part
(BL) is false, then there exists a sequence (pν , sν)ν in S×(e⊥)n and a sequence (qνj )ν
in Sn such that, for every ν, sν ∈ B 1
ν
\ intMt0 , pν ∈ −NX(projX(
∑n
j=1 Λj(s
ν
j ))),
(qνj ) ∈ ϕ(pν ,Λ(sν)) and
∑n
j=1(q
ν
j −pν) · (Λj(sνj )− yˆj) ≤ 0 for every (yˆj) ∈ At0 . Since
the sequence (pν , sν)ν is bounded, we can suppose without any loss of generality that
it converges to some element (p, s) ∈ S × (e⊥)n. From sν ∈ B 1
ν
\ intMt0 , we deduce
that s ∈ B0 = coMt0 and s 6∈ intMt0 . From pν ∈ −NX(projX(
∑n
j=1 Λj(s
ν
j ))), we
deduce that p ∈ −NX(projX(
∑n
j=1 Λj(sj))), hence p ∈ −NX(
∑n
j=1 Λj(sj)+te) with
t ∈ [t0,Θ(t0)] since s ∈ coMt0 \ intMt0 . From (qνj ) ∈ ϕ(pν ,Λ(sν)) and the upper
hemi-continuity of the normalized general pricing rule ϕ, we can suppose that the
sequence (qνj ) converges to some (qj) ∈ ϕ(p,Λ(s)). We finally deduce that
∑n
j=1(qj−
p) · (Λj(sj)− yˆj) ≤ 0 for every (yˆj) ∈ At0 , which contradicts Assumption (BLS).
Part (BS) of Lemma 3 is a consequence of Part (BS) of Assumption (BLS) and of
part (BL) of the lemma [see Remark 3]. uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 4: We first remark that, from Lemma 2, we have:
Yj =
{
y ∈ L λj (proje⊥(y)) + (y · e/‖e‖2) ≤ 0
}
.
Let A be the linear mapping from e⊥ × R to L defined by A(s, t) = s − t‖e‖e.
One easily checks that Yj = A(epi(‖e‖λj)), where epi(‖e‖λj) is the epigraph of the
function ‖e‖λj , that is epi(‖e‖λj) = {(s, t) ∈ e⊥ × R | t ≥ ‖e‖λj(s)}. The mapping
A : e⊥ × R → L is an isometry if ‖(s, t)‖ = √‖s‖2 + t2 is the Euclidean norm on
e⊥×R. Hence, for all (s, t) ∈ epi(‖e‖λj), ⊥Yj (A(s, t)) = A
(
⊥epi(‖e‖λj) (s, t)
)
, which
implies NYj (A(s, t) = A
(
Nepi(‖e‖λj)(s, t)
)
. Furthermore, from Corollary of Theorem
2.4.9 in Clarke (1983), we have:
∂(‖e‖λj)(s) =
{
p ∈ e⊥ (p,−1) ∈ Nepi(‖e‖λj)(s, ‖e‖λj(s))
}
.
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From these two results, one deduces that:
∂(‖e‖λj)(s) =
{
p ∈ e⊥ p+ 1‖e‖e ∈ NYj (Λj(s))
}
.
Noticing that ∂λj(s) = 1‖e‖∂(‖e‖λj)(s) and NYj (Λj(s)) ⊂ P from the free-disposal,
one deduces that:
∂λj(s) = NYj (Λj(s)) ∩ S −
{
(1/‖e‖2)e} .
Finally, the correspondence ∂λj , from e⊥ into itself, is upper hemi-continuous with
non-empty, convex, compact values since λj is Lipschitz continuous [see Proposition
2.1.2 in Clarke (1983)]. uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 5: From Lemmata 3.1 and 3.2 in Bonnisseau and Cornet (1990b),
under the assumptions of Lemma 2, there exists an open neighborhood Ω of Mab,
two positive real numbers α, ν and an infinitely differentiable mapping F : Ω → E
such that:
0 < α < inf F (s) ·∆(s′) for all s, s′ ∈ Ω satisfying ‖s− s′‖ ≤ ν. (16)
Moreover, for every s ∈ Ω, if ξ(s, ·) denotes the maximal solution of
s˙(t) = F (s(t)), s(0) = s ,
and I(s) the maximal interval of definition of ξ(s, ·), then ξ(s, ·) is a C∞ mapping
from I(s) to Ω, and there exists a compact neighborhood K ⊂ Ω of Mab and a
Lipschitz continuous function τ : K → R such that, for every s ∈ K:
τ(s) ∈ I(s) and 0 < −τ(s) <| a− θ(s) | /α, (17)
θ (ξ(s, τ(s))) = a. (18)
Since Ma ⊂ intM ⊂ Mb, we have ∂M ⊂ K and we can define the mapping
H : ∂M× [0, 1]→ E as follows:
H(s, t) =

(
s− ξ(s, tτ(s)))/t if t 6= 0,
−τ(s)F (s) if t = 0.
H is clearly continuous since ξ is the solution of the differential equation. For every
(s, t) ∈ ∂M× [0, 1]:
(a) infH(s, 0) ·∆(s) > 0;
(b’) H(s, 1) ∈ −intTM(s);
(c) H(s, t) 6= 0.
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Indeed, for every s ∈ ∂M, H(s, 0) = −τ(s)F (s). Therefore, from (16) and (17),
infH(s, 0) ·∆(s) = −τ(s) inf F (s) ·∆(s) > 0.
Moreover, for every s ∈ ∂M, H(s, 1) = s − ξ(s, τ(s)). But, from (18), ξ(s, τ(s)) ∈
∂Ma ⊂ intM. SinceM is a closed, convex subset of E and s ∈ ∂M, we then deduce
that H(s, 1) ∈ −intTM(s).
Let us finally show that H(s, t) 6= 0 for every (s, t) ∈ ∂M × [0, 1]. From (16),
this is true for t = 0. Now, from (16), the mean-value Theorem and the fact that
∂θ(s) ⊂ ∆(s), one deduces that θ(ξ(s, t)) is a strictly increasing function of t.
Consequently, s = ξ(s, 0) 6= ξ(s, tτ(s)) for all t > 0, which implies that H(s, t) 6= 0.
uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 6: For every ν ∈ N∗, we have τν ≤ −1/ν < 0. If the sequence
(τν) does not converges to 0, then there exists ε > 0 and a strictly increasing
sequence of natural numbers (νµ) such that τνµ < −ε for every µ ∈ N. For µ
large enough, 1/νµ < ε implies that min1≤i≤m{inf ri(APEνµ) − inf p · Xi} < −ε,
and there exists a consumer iνµ and an element (pνµ , (yνµj ) ∈ APEνµ such that
riνµ (pνµ , (y
νµ
j ))− inf pνµ ·Xiνµ < −ε. Since, for µ large enough, APEνµ is a subset
of S × At0 , which is compact under Assumptions (P), (C) and (BLS’) or (BS’) if
ϕ = MP , we can suppose without any loss of generality that the sequence (iνµ)µ
is constant, say equal to i, and that the sequence (pνµ , (yνµj )) converges to some
element (p, (yj)) ∈ APE. From the continuity of ri and the upper semi-continuity
of p→ inf p ·Xi, passing to the limit in ri(pνµ , (yνµj ))− inf p˜νµ ·Xi < −ε, we finally
get ri(p, (yj)) < inf p ·Xi, a contradiction with Assumption (R’). uunionsq
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